


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AIR WAR COLLEGE

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RESEARCH REPORT

No. AU-AWC-86-176

NO YEN FOR DEFENSE

By LT COL KENT V. RADFORD

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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
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NO YEN FOR DEFENSE

by

Kent V. Radford
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH
REQUIREMENT

Research Advisor: Professor Paul H. B. Godwin


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May 1986

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AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: No Yen for Defense

AUTHOR: Kent V. Radford, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

The security objective of America is to preserve the United States (US) as a free nation at peace, with its fundamental institutions and values intact. The center for world trade is moving east from Europe to Asia and the Pacific Basin. The economic well being of the United States is intrinsically tied to that of East Asia and the Pacific Basin. The primary threat to the US and its friends and allies in East Asia is the Soviet Union, with its ever increasing military presence in the area. To counter the Soviet presence and to contain it, the US must enter into alliances with the East Asia and Pacific Basin nations. Japan lies at the center of these alliances. Japan not only has a mutual security agreement with the US, but is also the world's third greatest economic power. However, because the reaction in Japan to its experiences in World War II, Japan is reluctant to remilitarize. Currently, Japan's interpretation of its constitution permits it to have a self-defense force. A ceiling of one percent of the Gross National Product has been placed on defense spending. This ceiling along with economic competition with the US has caused feelings of protectionism within the US. Efforts to urge Japan to speed up its defense construction and US enactment of protective legislation may cause a rift between the two nations that could weaken the alliance system.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Kent V. Radford (M.B.A., University of North Dakota) has extensive experience in operational planning. His initial assignment in the Air Force was at Luke AFB, AZ in 1967 where he served as a weapons controller. From Luke AFB he went to electronic counter-counter measures school at Keesler AFB, MS then onto Hancock Field, NY where he served in that capacity. From there he went to Point Barrow, AK where he served as the military commander of a Distant Early Warning sector and as USAF technical representative. In 1971 he went to the Armed Forces Intelligence School at Lowry AFB, CO. Upon graduation he went to the 544th Aerospace Reconnaissance Technical Wing and Headquarters, Strategic Air Command where he served as a systems intelligence officer. In 1975 he entered the Ballistic Missile Combat Crew Training Course at Vandenberg AFB, CA. Since that time he has served as a missile crew commander and flight commander at Grand Forks AFB, ND, missile tactician at SAC Headquarters, and a squadron commander at Minot AFB, ND. Colonel Radford is a graduate of Squadron officer School, Air Command and Staff College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces (National Security Management Course), and the Air War College, class of 86. His awards and decorations include the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Air Force Commendation Medal with two oak leaf clusters, Air Force Outstanding Unit Award with one oak leaf cluster, Combat Readiness Medal, and National Defense Service Medal.

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JAPAN, NO YEN FOR DEFENSE

CHAPTER I

Introduction

East Asia and the Pacific Basin is an area of strategic importance to the United States (US). In trying to conceptualize the importance of this region it must be remembered that the west coast of the United States borders the Pacific Ocean. Additionally, the state of Hawaii and some US territories such as Guam lie close to or directly in this area. Each of these states or territories possess port facilities where either civil commerce is conducted with Pacific and East Asian nations or critical military facilities are located. The importance of this region to the US is further emphasized by the fact that there are five mutual security treaties linking the US with countries such as Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, South Korea, and the Philippines. In many cases, the US has military facilities or arrangements to use facilities in each of these countries.

Secretary of State George Shultz has indicated that he believes that the global center of gravity is shifting from Europe to East Asia and the Pacific region.¹ The reason for this shift becomes obvious when you consider that American trade is growing faster in the Pacific Basin than any other part of the world. For example, during calendar year 1984, the US exported \$54.6 billion worth of goods to that area. In return, the US imported \$114 billion and invested \$30 billion. This

area now accounts for over 50 percent of the US national deficit.² While western Europe is still important in terms of trade, the fact is that over 30 percent of US trade is conducted with East Asia and the Pacific Basin and the importance of this region to economic well being cannot be ignored.³

The primary threat to US interests in East Asia and the Pacific Basin is the Soviet Union. The evidence of this threat can be measured by the weight of effort the Soviets are expending in strengthening their military might and their concentration on building a force which can project its power far beyond its borders. The Soviets believe that the US is its principal adversary and that the US has a powerful coalition of allies and friends in East Asia and the Pacific Basin. A coalition stretching from Japan to Australia. The Soviets are seeking to counter this alliance system and to develop a countercoalition of states friendly to themselves. Moscow seeks to isolate and encircle China in an effort to keep her weak. The Soviets do not fear China today, but what they do fear is an industrialized China with ties to the West including Japan. The Soviets also fear a close military alliance between the US and Japan. In fact, nothing would please the Soviets more than a break in military ties between these two nations. This is especially true in light of US pressure on Japan to build up its military forces and to participate in Joint exercises.⁴

The Soviet Union has a strong military presence in East Asia and the Pacific Basin which threatens US interests and that of its allies. Approximately 25 percent of the Soviet ground forces are located in East Asia along with 40 percent of its intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force. Thirty three percent of the Soviet Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) force is located in the Pacific along with 33 percent of its naval combatants. This naval force along with 33 percent of the strategic bombers present a formidable threat to the maritime lanes of communication which transverse the South China Sea, Sea of Japan, and the western Pacific. These forces can also be used to intimidate nations in the area. One third of the Soviet SS-20 force is located in the eastern regions of the Soviet Union and these medium range missiles present a direct threat to China, Taiwan, Japan, and other nations friendly to the US.⁵

Defense Secretary Casper W. Weinberger stated, "America's most basic national security objective is to preserve the United States as a free nation at peace, with its fundamental institutions and values intact."⁶ East Asia and the Pacific Basin play a critical role in the formulation of US security policy. The security and economic well being of this country is directly tied to that region. Without the economic interchange between the countries of that region such as Japan with the US and the mutual defense treaties our ability to keep ourselves secure would be in serious doubt.

The threat posed by the Soviets could reach crisis proportion if it is allowed to extend further beyond the current sphere of influence. US security policy is to contain or diminish Soviet influence in the region. The shipping lanes which connect each of the nations in the Pacific Basin transverse the Pacific from East Asia, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand to Hawaii and then onto the west coast of the United States or through the Panama Canal to the east coast. These shipping lanes are vulnerable to the growing Soviet Pacific fleet. With the Soviets possessing 110 attack submarines in the Pacific, commercial shipping would come to a stand still if a conflict were to arise between the US and the Soviet Union.⁷

While containment must have the highest priority, it can only be accomplished by creating a system of alliances in the region that will serve as a deterrent to Soviet expansionism and reduce the potency of its military forces. The basic structure for these alliances is in place with treaties that have been negotiated with Japan, South Korea, Philippines, the Manila Pact which incorporates Thailand, and the ANZUS treaty which incorporates Australia and New Zealand. These alliances have many payoffs. Primarily, a strong alliance system allows the US to achieve a level of deterrence which can not be achieved any other way.

The US has a world wide commitment of its military forces. It is virtually cost prohibitive for the US to have enough military might in both Europe and Asia to check Soviet

expansionism. In Europe, where the US force structure is strong and where the alliances are formidable, Soviet expansionism across the borders of influence established following World War II has not occurred. However, in the Middle East and East Asia a weak alliance system has permitted Soviet expansionism. The Soviets have been able to invade Afghanistan, destabilize the situation in Lebanon, take advantage of the Chinese invasion into Viet Nam by moving into Cam Ranh in 1979, and supporting a Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.

An essential element of US security policy is to encourage allied nations to build up a military might that will take care of their own indigenous self defense needs as well as supplement out own forces in the area. This is one area of diplomacy and military affairs that requires tact. First of all, we must realize that the threat perceived by our allies is not the same as that perceived by the US. For example, Malaysia and Indonesia do not believe that their primary threat comes from the Soviet Union but from China. This is due, in part, to the large number of ethnic Chinese that reside in their countries. While they care little for the Soviets, they see the Soviet influence in Vietnam as a counter to Chinese expansionism. In the case of Japan, the threat may seem to be the result of the bipolar atmosphere developed between the US and the Soviets with Japan in the middle. We must also realize that most of the nations in the region have very fragile economies and that large expenditures on a military budget could cause problems either

economically or politically for these nations. Japan has expanded its military commitments during the past few years but it has shied away from allowing its defense budget to break through the politically sensitive one percent of its Gross National Product (GNP) mark.⁸ It would seem that Japan has no Yen for defense but this is not the case.

Two nations lie at the heart of the US containment policy in East Asia and the Pacific Basin. These two nations are China and Japan. The US has developed economic ties with China over the past decade. This economic relationship, aimed at modernization of China's industrial base, heads Beijing's leadership agenda. While opening up new markets for US manufactured goods, it also can, over the long run, reduce chances for a Sino-Soviet rapprochement and counter Soviet expansionism. Currently, twenty five percent of the Soviet ground forces are being tied up on the Chinese northern border.⁹ However, because of China's lack of a modern defense base, the Soviet's ability to expand is held in check only by fear of China's large population. Japan on the other hand is the world's third most powerful economic and industrial nation who has an economy and industrial base necessary to support a deterrent force. This force supplementing US forces could deter Soviet expansionism.

In this paper I will explore Japan's economic and political systems and will show how Japan's effort to militarize can aid the US in deterring Soviet expansionism. I will also show that pressure placed by the US on Japan to alter its economic and military policy can backfire and play into the hands of Soviet Policy makers.

CHAPTER II

Japan's Government

At the conclusion of World War II, Japan's economy was in total disarray. Her heavy industry had been destroyed by US bombing and her merchant marine had been all but destroyed (8,141,591 tons) by US submarines (60 percent) and naval air (53 percent).¹ A major reconstruction of the economy was required in order to provide employment for the population and to return Japan to a place of prominence within the world community.

On the 2nd of September, 1945, sitting on the deck of the battleship Missouri, Japan signed the unconditional surrender of its forces to the allies. Under the terms of the agreement, Japan surrendered all the territories it had gained on the mainland of Asia and the islands it had governed in the Pacific. Occupation of Japan began in late August of 1945 with General Douglas MacArthur named as Supreme Allied Commander and responsible for the reconstruction of Japan. The government of Japan in-turn would act as the instrument to carry out the Supreme Commander's orders.

As Supreme Commander, General MacArthur set about to make Japan the "schoolhouse for democracy".² General MacArthur's goals were two fold: demilitarization and democratization.³ Demilitarization will be discussed in Chapter 4. General MacArthur remembered the results of the harsh punitive

punishment dealt the Germans following WW II. The Treaty of Versailles, humiliated the German people. It was this humiliation coupled with a depressed economy which opened up the door for Adolph Hitler to develop the Third Reich. The American planners were not going to let this happen in Japan. The planners adopted a constructive approach which sought to eliminate the Japanese threat by attacking the social and political roots that had spawned Japan's aggressive expansionist politics. The implementation of general MacArthur's reform policy was unique because the infrastructure of the Japanese government was left intact. The result was all reform directives were implemented by the Japanese authorities and not by the foreign conquerors. This enhanced the legitimacy and popular acceptance of the reforms.⁴

Democratization proceeded along two lines. The first was reconstruction of Japan's political institutions. The second was the institution of a broad set of social reforms designed to transform the socioeconomic structure and political culture of Japan. A new Japanese constitution was drawn up. This constitution was adopted by the Japanese government in 1946. The new constitution went into effect on Constitution Day, May 3, 1947. This new constitution provided for a parliamentary type of government known as the Diet. The system consists of a House of Representatives and a House of Councillors. The Diet elects one of its members as a prime minister who in turn selects the members of his cabinet. The prime minister is the executive power of the government. One of the most sweeping

changes of the constitution was the change of status of the emperor. The Emperor denounced his divinity and stated that his throne was to be based on trust and affection and not legends and myths. State sponsored worship of the emperor was abolished and government support of religious beliefs in schools was prohibited. Additionally, there was a divestment of sovereignty and political authority of the emperor. He became a symbol of state and the power of the state came from the people.⁵

There are many political parties in Japan. For the purpose of this paper I will list two primary parties. I mention these parties because they play a key role in the acceptance of US security policy by Japan. On the left is the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP). The right is the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The LDP is a consolidation of two conservative parties which existed before WWII. The LDP or its forerunners have dominated Japanese politics since the occupation.

CHAPTER III

Economies in Conflict

General Douglas MacArthur and his staff, concerned about the economic state of the Japanese people, set about to reconstruct the Japanese economy. The economy was to be built using the US industry as the standard. Technology resident in the US was given to the Japanese. The Japanese were quick to recognize the good aspects of American industry, take what they liked, then remodeled the American model into a system compatible with Japanese ideals.

The Japanese were invited to participate in a free market system which was larger than that which existed prior to WWII. Initially, there seemed to be a lot of problems with quality control. Many can remember a time when "made in Japan" meant cheap and not well built. In order to rectify the quality control problem, technicians were sent from Underwriters Laboratories to show the Japanese how to test their products and to get them up to American standards. The Japanese learned fast. They found that in a free trade market, the country who builds quality products the best for the cheapest cost will sell the most. In this regard, it was not difficult for the Japanese to enter the free markets because they had a work force who was grateful to work for low wages while workers in other countries were demanding higher wages.¹

Much of the initial output of Japanese government after the end of the war was concerned with repair of the economy. The Japanese were able to build their economy fairly fast. This was

possible because the people were not only skilled and willing to make the effort necessary to rebuild their economy but, the government could concentrate wholly on its industry. It was not necessary to split its national resources with defense. Under the provisions of article 9 of the constitution, the Japanese military had been eliminated. Defense would be provided by the US government. The decade of the 1950s was generally a period of consolidation and building for the future in both the domestic and foreign policy realms. The 1950s also witnessed the beginning of sustained period of government-stimulated economic growth which was to continue and accelerate in the 1960s.²

In the 30 years that have transpired since the end of WWII Japan has become the number 2 industrial producer in the world competing with the US not only for the world market but the US domestic market as well. For example, the Japanese have penetrated the US market deeply in areas such as auto production, electronics, and textiles. In 1963 Japan exported to the US 63,000 automobiles. In 1985, it is estimated that Japan will export 2.5 million. Since 1979 it has been estimated that 1,834,000 jobs in the textile and garment industries have been lost to Japanese imports. The depth of this penetration can be visualized when one looks about and sees where consumer electronics are made. There are currently no black and white televisions manufactured in this country. Video tape recorders, calculators, watches, office machinery, stereos, cameras, radios and many other items are built in Japan. In 1984 our trade

deficit in electronics surpassed our trade deficit in automobiles (\$15.45 billion).³

It was reported by the Associated Press that 1984's trade deficit for the US was \$250 billion and that \$33 billion of that deficit was with Japan.⁴ There are some sources which estimate Japan's portion of the deficit may be even more. This huge trade deficit has permitted Japan to take control of some 1500 US electronics firms in Silicon Valley, California and Route 128 in Boston, Massachusetts. There is little doubt that the Japanese are contesting American hegemony in the field of high technology (computers and semiconductors). Industrial espionage and unfair trade practices have resulted in demands for reciprocity.⁵

The impact the US industry and labor force has experienced from Japanese penetration of the US domestic market has resulted in calls for protective legislation. The legislation being sought calls for reductions of imports or tariffs which artificially raise the price of the imported goods. President Reagan has stated that he will fight any efforts towards protectionism because he does not feel that it will be in the US national interest. In fact, in December of 1985 he did veto a protectionist bill passed by congress designed to protect the textile industries.

Does calls for reciprocity and protective legislation coincide with with US security objectives? The answer to this question is not necessarily. While our basic national security objective is to preserve the US as a free nation at peace, with

its fundamental institutions and values intact, and surely the economy is one of those institutions, it cannot be proven that the US economy is about to collapse. There are other forces at work which threaten our economy more. Forces such as total national debt, high interest rates, the overvalued dollar, and inefficiencies in our own industry. Furthermore, protective legislation could threaten the existence of the very allies we need to help maintain stability in the world and to contain the Soviets.

Japan is an island nation with little natural resources. It must import all its raw materials then export finished goods. Japan purchases its raw materials from many nations in East Asia and the Pacific basin. Japan also imports goods from the US. Japan is the United States 2nd largest export market. What then would US trade legislation towards Japan accomplish? First, it would weaken the Japanese economy which is more fragile than ours. A nation which must import all its raw materials must be able to sell the finished goods. The labor force is employed in agriculture, transportation, and the manufacturing industries. No portion of the labor force is employed mining or producing raw materials. In order to keep its labor force employed, Japan would have to find other markets (Soviet Union) or attempt retribution. Second, it would tend to weaken economies of the nations which ship raw materials to Japan. Many of the friendly small nations of the region such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and others trade with Japan. These nations are developing nations who depend on Japan and other industrial

nations to buy their raw materials and help their economies grow. Third, it could create instability in the region. Economic unrest provides the catalyst for fermenting communist insurgency. When the a democratic capitalist government cannot produce a stable economy, the system is blamed for the problems. None of these results would serve US interests. Furthermore, protective legislation would support the Soviet's in their effort to create a rift in the US - Japanese relationship.

CHAPTER IV

Japanese Self Defense

Japan's unconditional surrender called for the disbanding of its military machine. In 1946 General MacArthur handed over the "MacArthur Notes" to the Japanese government and demanded a revision of the Meiji Constitution. What was demanded was renunciation of war.

"War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for settling its disputes and even for preserving its own security. It relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring the world for its defense and its protection.

No Japanese Army, Navy or Air Force will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon any Japanese force."¹

For the most part the wording quoted above became Article 9 of the new Japanese Constitution.

It was not long after the end of WWII that the US became involved in a cold war with the Soviet Union. The cold war became more intensified on June 25, 1950 when troops of the Communist ruled North Korea attacked South Korea in an effort to unify the country by force. The cold war along with the outbreak of war in Korea brought home to the Japanese that their country was not in a position to take care of its own security and that the US could be involved in a war that would not permit it to use its forces in defense of Japan. This realization caused the Japanese government to look at Article 9 and to initiate efforts to change the government's interpretation of the article. Prime Minister Yoshida in 1950 stated, "It is

clear that insofar as the country has regained its independence the right to self-defense exists."² This theme of the right to self-defense has become the justification of the conservatives of the LDP for redefining what Article 9 means. In other words, self-defense does not constitute war potential and therefore does not violate the constitution. Each prime minister, even the current prime minister, has been careful to emphasize that self-defense is a reinterpretation of Article 9 and not a revision. The reason for taking a soft approach to militarization is to erase the fears of the Japanese people that the government is trying to become a military power.

Several events since the Korean War have caused the Japanese to reassess their security requirements. The Nixon Doctrine, the Shanghai Communique, the Arab oil embargo, and the OPEC oil price increases along with the US withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975 forced Japan to feel its growing vulnerability. There was a feeling in the country that the US might not be a reliable ally. As a result of these events and heavy American pressure, in 1976 a program was implemented to upgrade Japan's military forces.³ However it decided that the defense budget would not exceed one percent of the GNP. This one percent has become a traditional guideline for defense expenditures since that time.⁴ Additional shocks which made Japan feel more vulnerable were President Carter's announcement that he planned on withdrawing most of the US troops in Korea; the fall of the Shah of Iran; the Irani-Iraqi War; and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The events near the Persian Gulf threatened

Japan's oil supply. Fortunately, President Carter reconsidered his plans to remove troops from Korea and this provided some relief to the Japanese. These events coupled with the Soviet deployment of a 10,000 man garrison on the Kurile islands and the deployment of SS-20's and Backfire bombers in the Far East was changing the military balance.⁵

The level of Japanese expenditure on defense has become a major issue in the US. There are two reasons for the issue: one is economic and the other is strategic. The US is experiencing economic problems at home. US industrial and labor leaders blame part of the economic problem on Japan because it is felt that Japan is taking advantage of unfair trade policies to gain hold of the American market. Further, while Japan is spending one percent of its GNP on defense the US is spending seven percent, of which some is spent in defense of Japan. Strategically, the US has come to realize that it cannot police the whole world. The US needs the aid of its allies to contain Soviet expansionism. Japan must play a key role.

The issue of pressing Japan to increase its military commitment for protection of its own territory and to supplement US forces in the area around Japan must be handled with care. First of all, demanding that the Japanese spend more yen on defense has serious political implications for the Japanese government. While most political parties in Japan agree that self-defense is necessary (this includes the JSP) few would condone a massive remilitarization. Second, while the US wants Japan to spend more on defense, it wants to reduce Japanese

exports to the US by implementing protective legislation. Professor Hugh Patrick, professor of Far Eastern economics at Yale University, stated in recent testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that he felt the tension in the relationship between Japan and the US is dangerous. He feels that each government is taking a short term, domestically oriented view of the world situation. This short term view could, over the next decade, unravel the alliance between Japan and the US.⁶ In the long term, the US does need Japan as an economic partner and a military ally. The US will have to continue to encourage Japan to cooperate economically and militarily but try to accomplish this at a slower pace. US policy makers will have to be sensitive to the psychological makeup of the Japanese while pressing on with the security requirements of the the region.

In understanding the US-Japanese defense relationship it is critical to acknowledge that the US is partly responsible for the attitude of the Japanese towards defense. Under the direction of General MacArthur and the occupation force, article 9 was introduced as part of the Japanese constitution. Additionally, the US shortly after WWII agreed to provide for the defense of Japan. A US-Japanese defense pact was signed in San Francisco on September 8, 1951. Under the terms of the treaty, the US had the right to disperse land, air, and sea forces in about Japan, and to use those forces, at the request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan caused through instigation or intervention

by an outside power or powers. The treaty also stated that Japan would not grant, without the prior consent of the US, any bases, or the right of garrison, or transit of forces, to any third power.

A treaty of mutual cooperation and security between the US and Japan was signed in Washington on January 19, 1960 and went into effect on January 23, 1960. This treaty replaced the US-Japanese defense pact of 1951 and placed Japan on equal grounds with the US. Under the terms of this treaty, the US and Japan would seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and encourage economic collaboration between them. In regards to the security of Japan and the Far East, the US was granted the use of Japanese facilities by its armed forces. This treaty has been renewed twice since that time and both parties have stated that they intend to continue their treaty commitments.⁷

Timothy J. Curran, a research associate for the East Asian Institute of Columbia University stated the following in testimony to the US Congress:

"On the question of Japan pulling its weight in the defense area, if I were Japanese, I would resent some of the American pressure. I remember at the time of the Afghanistan invasion Maggie Thatcher in Britain stood up on the podium and railed against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and then permitted her Olympic team to go to Moscow. Here in the United States we applauded this brave performance in standing up to the Soviet threat. The Japanese prime minister didn't have much to say, but he kept his Olympic team at home and suffered political damage. That was a tough decision for him to make. Yet, all we heard in the United States was critical of the lack of Japanese support for the American position."⁸

Japan has been moving towards more active security cooperation with the US. In 1981 Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki committed his government to defending air and sea lanes up to 1,000 miles south and east of Japan, and Prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone subsequently subsequently agreed to a division of labor with the US that defines defense roles and missions for each.⁹ The Japanese government has allocated hundred of millions of dollars to help defray the cost of American troops stationed in Japan. Also, the Japanese have began to participate in joint naval exercises with the US and Australia. The one percent self imposed limit the Japanese have placed on their defense effort may be a bone of contention for US policy makers. Yet it must be remembered that in absolute terms, the Japanese defense budget is the eighth largest in the world. Additionally, if Japan continues to spend at the present rate, its defense expenditures could be the fourth or fifth largest defense budget by 1990.¹⁰

CHAPTER V

Conclusion - Perspective

US involvement in the Spanish-American war, WWII, Korea, and Viet Nam shows that East Asia and the Pacific Basin is of strategic and economic importance to this country. The reason this area has become so important is the large volume of trade conducted between the countries in that region, the United States, and its allies. Another reason for the importance of this area is that many of the governments of this region are democratic and are part of an alliance system which helps the US to counter the Soviet threat. At the heart of the alliance systems in the area is Japan. This a country which has the potential to be a stabilizing force for the region because it possesses the economic and industrial might to mobilize a military force that in concert with the US can check Soviet Expansionism.

The security objective of the United States is to remain a free nation at peace, with its fundamental institutions and values intact. The primary threat to that objective is posed by the Soviet Union with its clearly stated desire to be the dominante force in world politics. In turn, the Soviet Union believes its primary threat comes from the US with the alliance system that now exists between the US and its East Asian and Pacific Basin allies. In order for the Soviet Union to expand its sphere of influence it must disrupt the alliance system which now exists. The Soviet Union is preparing to accomplish this by placing military forces in the region, encouraging

revolution, and encouraging a rift between the US and its allies.

Containment of Soviet expansionism must have the highest priority on the US security agenda. However, the costs to the United States in trying to contain Soviet expansionism on a world wide basis is prohibitive both in terms of manpower and money. Other nations whose current ways of life are threatened by this Soviet expansionism must be willing to share these costs. The most economical and effective way to accomplish this is to form mutual security alliances. The effectiveness of this type of alliance can be measured by the containment of Soviet expansionism in Europe by the NATO alliance when compared to others areas where alliances are weak.

Japan has to be encourage to assume a greater share of the alliance role. This means that it will have to begin to progressively depend less on the US for providing its security umbrella. Japan is the one nation in the East Asia and Pacific basin region who has the where-with-all, right now, to provide the strength necessary to decrease the Soviet influence. However, the issue of remilitarization of Japan will have to be handled delicately by the US and Japanese governments. It must be remembered that the constitution instituted by Japan during its reconstruction following WWII specifically prohibited remilitarization. This provision in the constitution was insisted on by the US. It has been a slow and deliberate attempt on the part of the Japanese government to counter the threat it perceives and to upgrade its self-defense forces

without incensing the Japanese population. This approach in remilitarization has worked so far. Increased pressure from the United States in terms of protective legislation to counter Japan's economic prowess and to speed up its remilitarization could upset this delicate process. This would play directly into the Soviet's hand and provide the ammunition necessary to create a rift between the United States and Japan.

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